Regulators as 'agents': power and personality in risk regulation and a role for
agent-based simulation by Davies, Gareth J. et al.
1Regulators as ‘agents’: power and personality in risk regulation and a role for1
agent-based simulation2
3
G.J. Daviesa, G. Kendallb, E. Soanec, J. Lib, F. Charnleyd and S.J.T. Pollarda*4
5
aCranfield University, The Collaborative Centre of Excellence in Understanding and6
Managing Natural and Environmental Risks, Cranfield, MK43 0AL, UK; bUniversity of7
Nottingham, School of Computer Science, Nottingham, NG8 1BB, UK; cLondon School of8
Economics, Department of Management, London, WC2A 2AE, UK; and dDe Montfort9
University, Institute of Energy and Sustainable Development, Leicester, LE1 9BH, UK.10
Abstract11
We critically examine how evidence and knowledge are brokered between the various actors12
(agents) in regulatory decisions on risk. Following a précis of context and regulatory process,13
we explore the role power and personality might play as evidence is synthesised and used to14
inform risk decisions, providing a review of the relevant literature from applied psychology,15
agent-based simulation and regulatory science. We make a case for the adoption of agent-16
based tools for addressing the sufficiency of evidence and resolving uncertainty in regulatory17
decisions. Referring to other environmental applications of agent-based decision, making we18
propose how an agent model might represent power structures and personality characteristics19
with the attending implications for the brokering of regulatory science. This critical review20
has implications for the structuring of evidence that informs environmental decisions and the21
personal traits required of modern regulators operating in facilitative regulatory settings.22
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2Introduction24
Modern regulation and public risk.25
Regulatory decision-making is undergoing a revolution in the UK. Proposals for26
modernising regulation within Government in the 1990s (Cabinet Office, 1999) are now27
being delivered through programmes and legislation on ‘better’ and ‘risk-based’ regulation28
(Blackman, 1998; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998; Pollard, 2001; Strategy Unit, 2002;29
Hampton, 2005; Hutter, 2005; Pollard et al., 2008; Gunningham, 2009). The premise is that a30
step change in decision quality can be delivered, with the regulation of public risk being31
targeted towards higher risks, and with decisions being more open to external scrutiny and32
challenge. Alongside, we observe a renewed emphasis on evidence in government decision-33
making; set within a historic climate of low public trust in policy decisions (Powell, 1999;34
House of Lords, 2000; HM Government, 2005; House of Lords, 2006). Departments and35
agencies have submitted evidence strategies to Government for review.36
Over the last ten years, substantive work has been conducted by government on the37
handling of risk and uncertainty (OXERA, 2000; Strategy Unit, 2002; POST, 2004; BRC,38
2006). The UK has published a national security assessment (2008), and an update (2009),39
and Government departments and their agencies are now expected to prioritise risks across40
their public service remits and direct resources accordingly. Government departments and41
agencies have also published ‘risk management frameworks’ (e.g. HSE, 2001) that set out the42
technocratic processes of risk management and options appraisal for managing risks within43
their organisational remits (Strategy Unit, 2002).44
However, some hold the view that these frameworks fail to capture the nuances of45
regulatory decision-making in practice (RCEP, 1998; Powell, 1999; Slater et al 2006).46
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3Making evidenced-based decisions on public risk not only involves the assembly of a47
technically sound assessment of risk, but is also a process of social interaction requiring48
feedback, negotiation, power play, brinkmanship, compromise, and dialogue (de Bruijn and49
Koopmans, 2005). Take the role that science plays in informing regulatory decisions. In its50
simplest form, regulatees procure scientific studies, among other evidence they may gather,51
in support of their operations; and regulators review these scientific assessment in the52
legislative context, may commission their own studies and then advise on a course of action53
in light of multiple lines of evidence, the aggregate of which must be assessed and weighed.54
Numerous actors are often present in these processes, especially for the regulation of complex55
operations such as nuclear operating facilities, waste facilities, integrated refineries for56
example. These actors may include professional advisors (consultants), academic57
researchers, technical laboratory staff, international experts, regulatory scientists, policy58
specialists and front line regulators. Evidence, as it is assembled, is not only secured under59
different auspices and mechanisms (contracts, research projects, consultancy, independent60
advice, reviews of the prior art), but also brokered between actors within and between the key61
parties. This is the subject of our research. We are interested in the brokering of evidence62
among the actors in regulatory decisions and to explore whether these processes can be63
represented with agent-based tools. Specifically we seek to explore the influence that power64
structures and key personalities might have on the brokering and acceptance (or not) of the65
evidence and knowledge that supports decisions on risk. Here, we review relevant66
contributions from the psychology, agent-based simulation and regulatory science literatures.67
Ultimately we seek to better understand how can we represent and learn from the behaviour68
of regulatory decision makers; notably the influence of power and their dispositions,69
specifically their personality and propensity to trust, in a structured fashion. Further, how can70
we then use this knowledge to progress toward better regulation? Prior research has made71
4some progress in characterising agents with psychological properties, however, there are72
considerable opportunities for using this technology to study decision making processes. This73
paper represents the first phase of a funded research programme that aims to bring together74
the fields of decision making and agent systems. In the sections that follow, we first explain75
what we mean by risk-based regulation and the brokering of evidence that support decisions76
on risk. We discuss the potential influence that personality and power structures may have on77
this process. Finally, we propose how we might investigate these influences using agent-78
based simulation technologies.79
80
Risk-based regulation and the brokering of scientific evidence81
State regulation is often viewed as the implementation of policy, being progressed82
through frameworks of due process and legislative documents (acts, regulations, annexes,83
statutory guidance) with specific outcomes in mind. Much of regulation is concerned with84
preventing harm to people and the environment. Within Europe, European Community (EC)85
institutions set the framework of Council legislation on Member States. In the environmental86
field, Directives are used as legal instruments, because of the flexibility they offer. Once87
agreed, Directives are transposed into national law through acts of Parliament and delegated88
secondary legislation (Bell and McGillivray, 2000). Conventional regulation has been89
criticised for being resource intensive and overly-prescriptive (Kirk et al, 2005); potentially90
inhibiting innovation and the development of new technologies (Wiener, 2004); creating an91
unfair competitive advantage by paying inconsistent attention toward regions and areas; and92
reducing the benefit regulatory resources can bring by imposing too large an administrative93
burden (Hampton, 2005). In response, modern, risk-based regulation seeks to allocate94
regulatory resources in proportion to the risks and interventions they require (BRC, 2006;95
Environment Agency, 2005; Hutter, 2005). Much of regulatory activity requires the issuing96
5of permits, licences and authorisations, usually supported by conditions, where failure to97
meet these results in some sanction. Risk assessments are used to inform the drafting of these98
conditions, many of which specify risk management measures to prevent harm occurring as99
the condition of the permit. What can meaningfully be said about the significance of risks100
depends on the extent and quality of the evidence that underpins the risk analysis, and one’s101
confidence in it. In practice, evidence is brokered between many actors, or ‘agents’ in the102
decision. Research can be procured or elicited from the research base; used alongside103
targeted, site-, or policy-specific studies; used to develop new lines of evidence that may104
support or contradict a line of reasoning; and in concert, is applied to develop an overall105
weight of evidence about a risk decision – for example, whether or not to extend an106
environmental permit for an integrated petroleum refinery, say; or whether to produce107
guidance on the consumption of alcohol within certain ‘safe’ limits.108
109
Three contexts: radioactive waste, carcase disposal and salt110
Consider for example, three decision contexts that feature high on the public risk111
agenda: (i) the presentation of a post-closure, environmental safety cases for radioactive112
waste repositories, (ii) the disposal of animal carcasses produced during exotic disease113
outbreaks; and (iii) deliberations about expert advice of the consumption of salt in the human114
diet. Each decision requires the regulator to draw on a complex evidence base to generate115
knowledge that can inform a policy or regulatory decision. Later we will return to these116
contexts and explore how agents-based approach might be applied.117
The importance of managing nuclear waste safely has been widely documented (e.g.118
IAEA 1994; HSE, 1999). An extended international debate over what constituted “good119
practice” in performance assessments for disposal facilities led to the development of risk120
criteria for disposals, based on the principles of sustainability. These currently require (in the121
6UK) that the performance of a waste repository does not generate exposures for humans that122
exceed an annual incremental risk of a ‘serious radiological detriment’ (health effect) of123
greater than one in a million. In England and Wales, the Environment Agency (EA) is124
responsible for the authorisation of radioactive waste disposal. In accord with public policy,125
repository operators undergo a periodic review of their permit by preparing a post-closure126
environmental safety case for the regulator, in which they are required to make good use of127
scientific evidence and knowledge. The assessment and management of future human128
actions and risks in these post closure risk assessments, given the longevity of radioactivity,129
poses a considerable intellectual challenge in terms of the availability and reliability of130
evidence and knowledge, and it places a substantive burden of proof on the operator to131
evaluate future risks up to 100 000 years forward in time. The use of reasoned argument,132
future scenarios and, structured approaches to the ‘evolution’ of the repository over time, are133
encouraged alongside the use of quantitative field and modelled data in support of the134
operator’s safety case. Once the safety-case has been formally submitted and all relevant135
parties have been consulted, the regulatory officer must make a recommendation for136
authorisation, or the re-authorisation for existing facilities. This is a hugely complex task137
involving multiple decision agents associated with the regulate, the regulator, and a large138
suite of other key stakeholders including local community representatives. Figure 1 provides139
a generalised summary of the key actors and flows of evidence involved in the regulatory140
review of a post-closure safety case used to support the decision on whether (or not) to141































Figure 1. An example structure of the institutional sub-components involved in the decision145
on reviewing post-closure safety cases. Individual boxes are often populated by an array of146
domain experts. In this case, representatives of the regulator’s policy function make147
recommendations to the Government Department and ultimately the Secretary of State148
regarding the reauthorisation of a facility (adapted from Yearsley, 2001).149
150
In Great Britain, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) are151
responsible for coordinating the disposal of diseased animal carcases. This requires Defra to152
have a working knowledge of the potential pathways that could lead to exposure of humans,153
animals and the environment to pathogens, chemicals and other hazards associated with154
carcase collection, disinfection and disposal (Pollard et al., 2008). Much of the risk155
assessment work is carried out ahead of time and is disseminated in the form of guidance156
notes for operational staff in the form of a generic contingency plan. In the event of an157
outbreak, the regulator uses this information in collaboration with expert advice from a158
8number of different parties (e.g. health departments and their agencies, veterinary officials,159
environment agencies, emergency planners and other professional partners) to inform their160
decisions on the most appropriate suite of disposal options.161
High concentrations of dietary salt have been reported to result in a significant162
increase in high blood pressure (Korhonen et al 1999), which is linked to coronary heart163
disease. Reducing salt intake has been reported to reduce average blood pressure levels in a164
clinical dietary control, in both sexes (Sacks et al 2001). In the UK, the Food Standards165
Agency (FSA) has set voluntary targets for reducing the average salt intake by adults to six166
grammes per day, based on recommendations made by a Scientific Advisory Committee on167
Nutrition (SACN). Because these targets are voluntary, their primarily aim is to encourage168
retailers and manufacturers to reduce salt in food products. As an incentive, the FSA publish169
‘league tables’ based on attempts made by organisations to meet this target. The FSA also170
runs major public heath campaigns, with other organisations, aimed at reducing the amount171
of salt in ‘social cooking’; and they recruit and train local peer facilitators to make the public172
more aware, generally, of the large amounts of salt that is added to their food.173
Many regulatory decisions, such as those above, are informed by various lines of174
evidence about the risk in question. These rarely point in the same direction because it may175
prove difficult to establish causal mechanisms within complex systems, and evidence lines176
may have different levels of theoretical and empirical support. Evidence thus requires a177
structured synthesis (Figure 2) so that an overall weight of evidence can be applied to the178
characterisation (significance and confidence) of the risk (Lowell et al 2000; Pollard et al179
2008). This practice frequently involves inputs from fundamental and applied scientists,180
scientific consultants, highly specified domain experts, advisory committees, expert referees,181
various publics with local or specialist knowledge, industry sector specialists with their182
scientific advisors, technical policy development specialists, and so on.183
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Figure 2. A conceptual simplification of the brokering of evidence and knowledge.185
186
Actors in this process (Figure 2) secure different sources of primary scientific evidence (e.g.187
experimental or field data), assemble knowledge from it (e.g. the predicted future behaviour188
of contaminants discharged to an aquatic environment) and pass knowledge on the a decision189
maker who must consider the evidence on a specific issue (e.g. the risk of harm to a specific190
ecosystem) in concert. This occurs through a sequence of transactions between agents191
(people), to an ultimate decision maker for an assessment of the significance of the risk and a192
decision whether to accept the risk or not, and how to manage it. The brokering of evidence193
and knowledge in practice is far less idealised and inherently uncertain due to information194
gaps, the existence of competing theories and the presence of manifold scientific uncertainty195
(Powell, 1999). Risk-informed decision-making is thus value-laden, not least because196
decision participants, agents, make value judgements regarding the sufficiency and credibility197
of available information. Moreover, individuals do not make stable decisions under198
uncertainty. Decisions made are to some degree biased by participants’ perceptions of the199
decision environment (Slovic et al 1982; Slovic, 2000). Further, risk characterisation itself200
requires a discussion of values with a pre-requisite discussion of risk appetite (Tuler et al201
2005). Under these conditions, unfettered assessments and assembly of the direction,202
= scientific knowledge = decision maker= scientific evidence
= lines of evidence = lines of dependence
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strength and weight of evidence that constitute an assessment of the risk, may not be possible.203
Current technocratic risk management frameworks fail to account for this and, in doing so,204
may compromise the level openness and transparency that they attempt to infer.205
We are interested in constructing a richer description of this brokering process. In the206
discussion that follows, we refer to evidence as ‘raw data’ and to knowledge as207
‘interpretations’ of the evidence that inform an assessment of the significance of the risk. For208
example, environmental regulatory officials must frequently evaluate the risks posed by new209
operational plant or the incremental risks of changes to plant design and or layout. A210
regulatory officer may need to decide, for example, on the reliable performance of an in-plant211
wastewater treatment works for the biological treatment of pharmaceutical residues in212
process streams prior to discharge to receiving surface water. Raw data on the treatment213
performance on individual unit processes must be received from the operator, processed so to214
evaluate the risk of exceeding environmental quality standards, and then used to establish215
compliance criteria in consultation with the operator. Often this data, and the risk216
assessment, will be supplied by the operator and their professional advisors (environmental217
consultants, say) in support of a modification to the plant. Agents within this process must218
receive, process, and pass-on evidence and knowledge to other actors. Ultimately, the local219
regulatory official must make a decision about whether to issue a permit to an upgraded in-220
house wastewater plant, say. If the two nodes at the bottom represent an operator and a221
consultant, the square dotted arrows can represent the evidence they gather. If the node at the222
top of this figure represents a regulatory officer (decision maker), the solid arrows can223
represent the scientific knowledge presented to the regulator after the operator and consultant224
has placed the scientific evidence in context of the risk question being asked. Then the round225
dotted arrows represent the outcome; the confidence the regulator has in approving the226
authorisation of an environmental permit, say. At each step, a recipient may wish to accept227
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or reject the scientific evidence and knowledge provided, usually by determining how228
sufficient and dependent different sources of scientific evidence and knowledge are.229
Interactions between agents in these discussions are critical. Evidence is often brokered with230
a ‘tag’ – a supporting case for its acceptance (or not) that passes between parties. The231
rejection of evidence, or that matter the indecision over evidence submitted, has severe cost232
implications for regulatees, in that they may need to procure additional studies or delay233
improvements. Thus the characteristics of the agents themselves and the power they exercise234
may have influence on the brokering of evidence, its acceptance and the construction of235
compelling cases that attend technical assessments of risk. Wardman’s (2008) risk236
government model suggests the dispositions and behaviour of decision makers are important237
to the decision making process and its outcomes.238
The following sections explores these facets and critically assess how a decision239
maker’s power and personality may determine whether or not they engage in dialogue with240
the provider of evidence and/or knowledge, and whether this is likely to be conducive to the241
resolution of decision uncertainty and thereby imbue confidence that there is sufficient242
evidence to support (or refute) the risk question being posed. We focus on one aspect of243
each: personality as a characterisation of dispositions, and the exercise of power as an244
example of decision makers’ behaviour.245
246
The role of power247
A taxonomy of power248
Power is the ability to control one’s environment and the behaviour of those within it249
(Dahl, 1957; French and Raven, 1959; Kanter, 1979). In the context of brokering evidence250
and knowledge, power is realised by an individual’s capacity to include or exclude251
information, contingent on their view of its’ validity and relevance to the decision. Power252
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structures represent the influences people have, and thus the distribution of power, by253
reference to individual status and the period for which they hold power. A substantive254
literature exists on the dynamics of power (e.g. French and Raven, 1959; Morgan, 1986;255
Paton, 1984; Stephenson, 1985; Liao, 2008a; 2008b). Here we focus on French and Raven’s256
(1959) taxonomy of five forms of power (Figure 3): legitimate, referent, expert/informational257
, reward and coercive; defined below. These describe the sources of power that a participant258
may exercise, and the influences they hold within a power structure (Belaya et al 2008).259
260
Figure 3. French and Raven’s (1959) five forms of power related to the brokering of261
evidence and knowledge262
263
This taxonomy plays out in authentic regulatory decisions as the various agents to the264
decision exchange, sort and validate evidence in support of risk characterisation. The first265
aspect of an agent’s power to influence the brokering process is their ability to ‘receive’266
scientific evidence and knowledge, and relates to their legitimate power. Legitimate power267
refers to an individual’s position within a power structure and is usually equated with268
authority (Handy, 1999). The power resides with the position held, rather than with the269
















and oblige others to comply with a course of action. For example, a regulatory inspector is271
legally empowered to inspect and gather environmental compliance data. Legitimate power272
is only as strong as it is supported, and additional ‘guaranteeing’ sources of power can273
reinforce it. For example, providing site inspectors with access to reward power, coercive274
power and referent power may further strengthen their legitimate power.275
Reward power is relevant to an individual’s ability to offer an incentive (Belaya et al276
2008) and may be obvious in the case of an inspecting officer’s ability to encourage the277
submission of compliance data. Less obvious might be the rewards offered for the delivery278
of timely information.279
Coercive power is relevant to an individual’s ability to punish those who do not280
comply. Although this may provide a regulator with short term gains, it may also prove to be281
ineffectual in the long run (Rahim et al 2001) and is less in keeping with modern views over282
facilitative regulation. In general, the expression of coercive power may result in resentment283
and resistance because it is fuelled by the respondent’s desire for the reward and the fear of284
having it withheld (Molm, 1997). The mere perception that a recipient agent has coercive285
power may be sufficient to yield information. However, if coercive power is abused, it can286
evoke conflict, resulting in a regulator being reprimanded; for example, via judicial review.287
Referent power will also aid a recipient agent’s capacity to receive evidence and288
knowledge. Referent power helps build compliance and, in contrast to legitimate power,289
resides with the personality of the individual. It takes time to establish. For example, an290
inspecting officer’s role is supported when they maintain a long-standing relationship with291
the operator, and requires the officer to communicate a sufficiently convincing reason why an292
operator should comply with a specific request. If the officer is successful in establishing this293
relationship, s/he can be considered to hold a degree of referent power; thereby facilitating294
access to evidence and knowledge in support of a decision. However, if the relationship295
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between an operator and an officer is brief and the officer has only a small window of296
opportunity to establish referent power, this opportunity may be lost. Hence, referent power297
is only as effective as the extent to which recipients become exposed to it.298
The second aspect of an agent’s power to influence the brokering of evidence and299
knowledge is their ability to ‘process’ it. Here, we mean the synthesis of evidence in the300
context of the risk characterisation – how significant in the risk and, by extension for301
unacceptable risks, what measures should be imposed to secure reductions to a level of302
residual risk? Again, legitimate power is the first point of call. An individual’s influence303
will depend on the extent their role allows, or expects them to partake in the gathering,304
processing, analysis, or third party review of evidence and knowledge. French and Raven’s305
(1959) other four forms of power have minimal impact on a participant’s ability to influence306
on the processing of scientific evidence and knowledge.307
308309
The final aspect is an agent’s ability to ‘pass-on’ the evidence and knowledge310
provided to them to other agents. The original recipient now becomes the provider as s/he311
‘receives and accept’ information and then passes it on to other agents in the decision312
process, usually labelled with some statement of its validity and/or their confidence in it. The313
ability to pass-on evidence is intertwined with the ability to receive it because power operates314
both relationally and reciprocally. For example, a recipient’s legitimate power may allow315
them to reject information, but whether this happens or not depends on whether they perceive316
the provider to have expert and/or referent power. Expert power, for example, can only be317
inferred upon agents by those on whom it will be exercised, and must be explicitly and318
implicitly recognised to exist. As such, expert power is said to be the most socially319
acceptable form of power (Handy, 1999). Hence, placing this in the context of our study, if a320
provider has expert power then it can be assumed that the recipients will be receptive to the321
scientific knowledge provided. However, if for any reason the recipient becomes aware of322
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‘credibility gaps’ associated with the evidence and knowledge provided to them, the323
provider’s expert power can become discredited (Handy, 1999). When expert power is no324
longer perceived to exist in the providing agent, the recipient agent may reject the evidence325
and knowledge provided they have legitimate power in which to do so. Hence, a provider’s326
ability to pass-on scientific evidence and knowledge with credibility will also depend on327
whether the recipient is receptive.328
In summary then, the brokering of evidence and knowledge can be viewed as being329
mediated through a power structure, whereby agents with a range of interests have varying330
degrees of authority to determine the flow, acceptance, and transfer of information to inform331
decisions on risk. The power relationships are designed to ensure the right people are best332
placed to exercise the appropriate type of power at the right time (Figure 1). However, power333
requires a balance between parties, it operates relationally and reciprocally and it is334
subjective. It depends on whether the agent is in a position to exercise power, as well as their335
personality, since personality can also influence the mechanisms through which power might336
be enacted and decision making occurs.337
338
The role of personality339
The five factor model340
Personality research is concerned with the psychology of the whole person (Epstein,341
1996). In this section, we review a widely used model of personality and discuss its342
application to the regulatory decision process. One of the most popular measures of343
personality is the five-factor model (Costa and McCrae, 1992). This has been accepted by344
scholars (e.g. Barrick et al 1998; Denissen and Penke, 2008; Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1990;345
Hong et al 2008; John, 1990; John and Srivastava, 1999) and encompasses the most346
significant variations of human personality (Ivancevich and Matteson, 1999; Robbins, 2003).347
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The model comprises five personality traits. Neuroticism is the extent to which people are348
nervous, anxious and prone to stress. Extroversion refers to tendencies to be sociable,349
assertive and experience positive emotions. Openness to experience concerns preferences for350
novelty and creativity. Agreeableness is the extent of co-operation, trust and tender-351
mindedness. Conscientiousness describes preferences for order, goal focus and achievement352
striving. Since personality is reasonably stable over time (Costa and McCrae, 1992; Johnson,353
1999), it provides useful information about how individuals will approach decision making354
and the exercise of power. Extensive studies have demonstrated how the personality traits355
relate to an individual’s typical behaviour. For example, there is widespread evidence for356
links between personality and workplace behaviour (e.g. Back et al 2006; Berry et al 2007;357
Burke and Witt, 2004; Flaherty and Moss, 2007; Lee et al 2005). Insights from this field358
could also help to explain the influences that personality has on the brokering of evidence and359
knowledge, and on an agent’s ability to uphold certain responsibilities for the processing of360
information.361
There are also important interactions between personality and situations that influence362
behaviour. The person-by-situation approach has been the source of much debate (e.g. Bem,363
1983; Blass, 1991; Bowers, 1973; Endler, 1984; Eysenck and Eysenck, 1980; Johnson, 1999;364
Reynolds and Karraker, 2003; Saucier et al 2007; Shoda, 1999; Ten Berge and De Raad,365
1999; Ten Berge and De Raad, 2002), with some questioning how valid and novel it really is366
(e.g. Funder, 1996; Johnson, 1999). This said, it has become increasingly popular within367
modern personality research, and scholars generally agree in the value of its approach (e.g.368
Borkenau et al 2006; Fleeson, 2007; Graziano et al 2007; Kammrath et al 2005; Withey et al369
2005). In recognition of this, scholars such as Mischel have examined the role that situational370
forces have on the emergence of behaviour (Mischel, 1999; Shoda, 1999). These authors371
argue for characterising personalities by stable patterns of behaviour, and by distinct and372
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stable patterns of situation-behaviour relations (Shoda et al., 2002). This combined ‘if…373
then…’ approach has allowed researchers to create so called ‘behavioural signatures’ that are374
predictive of patterns of variability across different situations (Mischel, 1999; Mischel and375
Shoda,, 1995; Shoda, 1999; Shoda et al 2002). This allows researchers to specify how traits376
play out with increasing precision under different situations (Ten Berg and De Raad, 1999).377
Distinct if… then… behavioural signatures might be sued to explain the influence378
personality has on the brokering of evidence and knowledge within risk decisions. If so,379
these traits could be assigned to agents and represented in a modelled system. Consider the380
influence that the five factor model could exert on the brokering process in the context of381
knowledge sharing (e.g. Bakker et al 2006; Liu, 2008; Mooradian et al 2006) as this is central382
to regulatory decision-making. Bakker et al (2006) separate knowledge sharing into the383
phases of exploration and exploitation. The former describes the point at which agents384
discuss and work together to solve a problem; the latter the phase in which knowledge is385
integrated (Bakker et al 2006). Analogously, we refer to the exploitation phase as the act of386
‘receiving and accepting’ evidence and knowledge and the exploration phase as the act of387
‘engaging in dialogue’.388
389
Knowledge exchange and trust390
A considerable amount of work has been undertaken into what constitutes knowledge,391
where it is derived from and how it can be effectively nurtured, transferred and assimilated392
(Major and Cordey-Hayes, 2000). Knowledge is invariably dynamic, context specific and393
intangible. Bhagat et al. 2002 (in Claver-Cortes et al., 2007) argue that knowledge originates394
from unique experiences and organisational learning, and is present not only in written395
documents but also in the routines, tasks, processes, practises, rules and values of396
organisations. This type of knowledge is tacit and as such it is hard to verbalise because it is397
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expressed through action based skills and cannot be reduced to rules and recipes or easily398
captured, stored and distributed (Sahota et al., 2007). Metcalfe and Gibbons (1989) suggest399
that the “knowledge base” of an organisation comprises the individual human resources and400
mechanisms of interaction. Subsequently, close attention has to be paid to the people,401
culture, organisational structures, and information technology because knowledge is rooted in402
human experience and social context (Havens and Knapp, 1999). Pyoria (2007) argues that403
knowledge intensive organisations should value human relations above technology and create404
an atmosphere of passion and enthusiasm and a culture of innovativeness and creativity.405
Earl (1994) suggests that knowledge management requires a combination of406
technological and social action; that is organisations must develop ways of ensuring that the407
organisational culture is conducive to knowledge sharing. Henry (1995; in Gererdo et al.,408
2002) argues that although individuals bring resources to the group, they may not use these409
effectively unless asked to do so. Therefore it appears that however much effort it spent410
implementing an organisational structure that encourages knowledge sharing, knowledge411
ultimately resides with individuals (Gerardo et al., 2002). Knowledge processes are then412
concerned with micro-social interactions among individuals (Gererdo et al., 2002). This focus413
on individual cognitive activity as the central element in an organisation’s acquisition and414
processing of information is critical to our discussion of an agent’s actions during the act of415
“receiving and accepting” and the act of “engaging in dialogue”. There are many other416
factors that affect knowledge sharing, such as: (i) the properties of knowledge (e.g. the degree417
of articulation and aggregation; Blacker, 1995; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Spender, 1996);418
(ii) organisational culture (Wasko and Faraj, 2005); and (iii) interpersonal relationships419
(Hansen, 1999; Levin and Cross, 2004). However, the most common facet referred to is the420
influence of trust (e.g. Abrams et al 2003; Levin et al 2006; Mayer et al 1995; McEvily et al421
2003) which has obvious implications for the credibility of evidence and knowledge.422
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Rotter (1971) defined trust as “the generalized expectancy held by an individual that423
the word, promise, oral or written statement of another individual or group can be relied424
upon”. In its literal sense, we refer to trust as a recipient agent’s belief that the evidence and425
knowledge provided is both reliable and sufficient. Mayer et al (1995) posited the “higher a426
trustor’s propensity to trust, the higher the trust for the trustee prior to availability of427
information about the trustee”. These definitions suggest that trust will indicative of a428
person’s willingness to engage in sharing knowledge (e.g. Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Uzzi,429
1997) and depend on the recipient’s propensity to trust. Propensity to trust is related to430
dispositional trust - the general willingness to trust others (Mayer et al 1995), which is neither431
focused on specific others nor dependent on specific contexts (Mooradian et al 2006).432
Interpersonal trust, on the other hand, is a measure of how trustworthy participants433
perceive others to be. It is determined by the situation and is multi-dimensional (e.g.434
McAllister, 1995; Rempel et al 1985; Abrams et al 2003). Abrams et al (2003) define435
interpersonal trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable” (Dirks and Ferrin, 2001;436
Gambetta, 1988; Kramer and Tyler, 1966; Mayer et al 1995), suggesting that participants437
display more interpersonal trust and knowledge sharing behaviour when they are more438
willing to accept vulnerability. In this regard, Evans and Revelle (2008) describe439
vulnerability as a ratio of costs (e.g. betrayal) and benefits (e.g. reciprocity) where the440
uncertainty over gains or losses motivates (or discourages) trusting behaviour. These authors441
suggest that those with a propensity to trust are more inclined to establish interpersonal trust442
and engage in knowledge brokering and networking (Becerra and Gupta, 2003; Evans and443
Revelle, 2008; Swan et al 2002).444
Studies have also linked personality to trust and knowledge sharing (e.g. Evans and445
Revelle, 2008; Martins, 2002; Mooradian et al 2006). Evans and Revelle (2008)446
demonstrated that trust, rather than trustworthiness, predicted whether a recipient would447
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return money in a standard economic investment game. They demonstrate that the tendency448
to ‘trust’ was positively correlated with extroversion and negatively with neuroticism, and449
that ‘trustworthiness’ was positively correlated with agreeableness and conscientiousness.450
Only agreeableness was related to the amount of money invested, with more money being451
invested under the send-only condition compared to the simultaneous condition. It was452
suggested that agreeableness motivated more interpersonal trust under greater levels of risk453
and uncertainty (Evans and Revelle, 2008), possibly motivated by the opportunity to454
cooperate rather than compete (Liao and Chuang, 2004). Hence, although propensity to trust455
may translate as a propensity to engage in interpersonal trust, this will depend on whether the456
situational context motivates agents to do so.457
458
Managing uncertainty459
Scholars also explain that the uncertainty associated with information that is brokered460
may account for a large proportion of an agent’s motivation. Hodson and Sorrentino (1999),461
explain that the composite of a person’s approach to uncertainty (Sorrentino et al., 1992) and462
certainty (Cherry and Byrne, 1977) allows them to deal with the complexities of information-463
processing. Investigating the relationship with the five factor personality traits, only464
openness to experience was found to be positively related to a person being uncertainty465
orientated, suggesting that given the choice, these individuals are more likely to approach466
uncertainty in the hope of resolving it (Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999). Thus, research467
suggests it is possible to predict whether a recipient agent would be unwilling to “receive and468
accept” evidence and knowledge without first engaging in dialogue, by knowing whether: (i)469
the level of uncertainty associated with the evidence and knowledge motivates them to do so;470
(ii) they have prior knowledge that causes them to believe that the provider is trustworthy471
(e.g. having sufficient expert power); or (iii) they lack prior knowledge but have the472
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propensity to trust. Failing this, and assuming a recipient has sufficient legitimate power, an473
exploration phase would proceed an exploitation phase. During the exploration phase474
propensity to trust, interpersonal trust, and willingness to engage in knowledge sharing will475
play a role. For risk-based decisions, the most enduring characteristic being brokered is the476
level of uncertainty associated with evidence and knowledge (see Bradshaw and Borchers,477
2000).478
In summary, personality research suggests that whether agents will be motivated to479
carefully and systematically process information will, in part, depend on their ‘behavioural480
signatures’ by reference to the five factor model and their uncertainty orientation. In the481
context of brokering evidence and knowledge for regulatory decisions, the recipient agent482
must determine whether they agree with the providing agent over the sufficiency of the483
evidence and knowledge to support a decision. Unlimited time and resources might permit484
success to be measured in terms of how conducive dialogue is to the resolution of485
uncertainty. Indeed, some regulatees may recognise certainly uncertainty resolution in these486
decisions as a key factor in the occasional delays experienced in securing regulatory487
approvals for contentious or complex developments. Thus there would appear to be some488
merit in exploring whether issues of power, personality and uncertainty resolution could be489
explored in a more systematic way, perhaps through using agents-based tools.490
491
Regulatory actors as ‘agents’492
Applying agent-based models within regulation493
An understanding of decision makers’ personality and exercise of power is useful to494
effective development and communication of regulatory decisions. However, opportunities495
for examining the range and combinations of personality, power, and different decision496
contexts in real-world regulatory decision contexts are limited. One approach to developing a497
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construct for decisions and exploring behaviour is by representing ‘agents’ in a computer498
model (Zhang and Zhang, 2007). A computer agent is autonomous with the ability to499
function independently; goal directed with a capacity to assess the outcome of its behaviour500
relative to its goals; and flexible with the ability to recognise traits of other agents and learn501
from its environment. Hence, an ‘agent’ can be perceived as being a discrete component with502
a set of characteristics and rules that set its decision making capability (Macal and North,503
2006). Proponents of agent based modelling claim it offers insights otherwise unobtainable504
by using conventional research methods. Applications of the approach include modelling505
behaviour in knowledge-based jobs such as trawling strategies (Beecham and Engelhard,506
2007), stock markets, supply chains (Macal and North, 2006), and waste management507
(Courdier et al., 2002). The key advantage of an agent-based model is its capacity to describe508
and simulate complex systems (Courdier et al., 2002; Chaturvedi et al., 2000; Kurahashi and509
Terano, 2005). Environmental decision contexts, complex by their very nature, have been510
tackled using agent based approaches to negotiating on groundwater demand management511
(Feuillette at al., 2003), optimising the effectiveness of greenbelt in periurban settings512
(Brown et al., 2004), improving forest ecosystem management strategies (Nute et al., 2004)513
and recently for modelling pine beetle infestation (Perez and Dragicevic, 2010). By514
combining knowledge of individual and strategic choice, automated decision makers can515
reflect the complex interaction of humans when making decisions under uncertainty, taking516
account of the behaviour of others. These tools have allowed researchers to vary the517
components of the decision-making environment, and of the actors themselves, to generate a518
greater understanding of how group decisions are secured. Scholars working in the field of519
artificial intelligence have modelled the influence personality human decision making520
(Alavizadeh et al., 2008; Canuto et al., 2005; Ghasem-Aghaee and Ören, 2007; Nassiri-521
Mofakham et al., 2008, 2009) and power (e.g. Prada and Paiva, 2009; Marreiros et al., 2008;522
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Cincotti and Guerci et al., 2005). However, applications to the regulatory environment and523
the human interactions between parties engaged in the brokering of evidence and knowledge524
have to date been limited.525
How might such a model be constructed, verified and validated? Figure 4 illustrates the526
hierarchical relationship between power and personality as it relates to a recipient’s belief in527
the sufficiency of the information being provided to support a decision. One might envisage528
a representation, albeit grossly simplified compared to the realities of social interaction in529
these contexts, in which conditional weights might be applied to traits and sub-traits and a530
power/personality weight be derived. This might then be used to modify a recipient’s initial531
belief about the sufficiency of the scientific evidence and knowledge provided.532
533
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Here, we assume that the recipient agent is an intelligent customer for the evidence brokered,538
and is fully aware of what the guidance of the use of science in regulatory decision-making539
requires of them. Therefore we focus on the influence power and personality may have on a540
recipient’s ability to manage uncertainty in this evidence and knowledge and interact with541
other agents accordingly. Dependency and necessity are assumed to be less subjective;542
perceived as hard and fast rules less likely to change modify the recipient’s belief. We543
suggest there is some scope here to develop a dynamic agent-based model capable of544
exploring the potential influence power and personality have on risk regulation. Clearly, we545
do not claim this could offer predictive insight; rather we believe this will provide a means of546
exploring different scenarios; providing scope for better more improved regulatory and policy547
decisions; and in particular, illustrate how the influence of power and personality might play548
out in each of these of our example decision contexts introduced above.549
For example, in the disposal of radioactive waste, a key role for the Environment550
Agency (EA) as regulator is to determine how sufficient and valid is the information provided551
by the operator is to the post-closure risk assessment (Figure 1). The trust established552
between the Agency and the operator, and between the internal and external expert advisers553
may influence judgements made on the sufficiency of the available information. If the554
Agency perceives the operator to be trustworthy, holding a degree of referent power, then555
they will be more inclined to accept the operator’s line of argument in support of the long556
term safety of a facility. However, this may also depend on how trustworthy the Agency557
perceives alternative sources to be; and what degree of expert power the internal and/or558
external consultants are considered to hold. Hence, the decision making process entails559
extensive dialogue, not only between the Agency and the operator and the internal and560
external consultants, but also between the consultants and the operator. Moreover, much of561
the information being brokered will be qualitative and value laden, so the capacity to progress562
25
decisions in a climate of considerable uncertainty is critical to securing a recommendation (in563
this case to the Secretary of State) within a bounded timeframe. The level of trust established564
between parties influences the brokering process. There are also important implications here565
for the personal competencies and skill sets of regulators, regulatory scientists, company566
representatives and lead consultants.567
For the disposal of animal carcases organisations operate within an emergency568
response situation. Time constraints and good practice dictate that much of the risk569
assessment work is carried out in advance. In the event of an outbreak a key role for Defra is570
to determine the best course of action to minimise the risks of onward exposure, making good571
use of available guidance and expert advice. Hence, they must have a working knowledge of572
exposure routes, and the risks they pose, and access to expertise that can contextualise this573
knowledge during an outbreak. It is imperative Defra can trust expert advice so they can act574
quickly. Moreover, the level of interpersonal trust between the multiple actors involved here575
consultants may influence the extent to which referent, coercive, reward, expert and576
informational power can be established.577
With respect to expert advise on salt in the diet, a primary role of the FSA is to578
determine the best course of action to minimise harm. Accountability for public risk here lies579
with the manufacturers and the public themselves and so the FSA’s role is to educate the580
general public and encourage food manufactures to act responsibly. To achieve this, the FSA581
must maintain expert power and informational power in passing on (communicating) the582
current scientific evidence and knowledge. Hence, it is essential that the FSA be perceived as583
being factual and trustworthy, particularly to the general public so that published league584
tables and public health campaigns have the desired effect and the FSA can therefore585
establish reward and coercive power with manufacturers.586
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These brief explorations above illustrate the importance of regulators being both587
scientifically competent and facilitative in their discussions with regulatees, in keeping with588
the tenets of modern regulation. Enforcement authorities must be competent communicators,589
capable of making clear what they expect. Moreover, they must maintain an open and fluid590
communication with operators, because misunderstandings and poor communication might591
otherwise undermine the quality of decisions made.592
593
Conclusions594
Personality and power have a marked influence on group decision making. However,595
the influence they have on risk regulation through the brokering of scientific evidence is less596
understood and rarely examined in the practical context of regulation, as opposed to597
regulatory design. The application of agent-based tools may be an opportunity to learn from598
the influence of power and personality in a structured fashion so as to improve our design for599
better regulation. Insights from the literature have been presented as they relate to the600
brokering of scientific evidence and knowledge in regulatory decisions. We believe these are601
important, not only for conventional state regulation, but for the increasing application of602
hybrid regulatory models involving public and private sector interventions (see van der603
Heijden, 2009 on building regulations, for example). This paper has set out a critical review604
and set a forward agenda for our research. Future manuscripts in preparation discuss605
developments of our model and will evaluate the output from these simulations.606
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